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Criminal Justice and the Rule-Making Power*
HONORABLE J. EDWARD LUMBARD**
The Miranda' decision of June 1966 and the ensuing debate
regarding the effect of that decision on law enforcement is an
appropriate starting point for a discussion of the methods which
are best suited to enable our courts to bring about many of the needed
improvements in the administration of criminal justice. I propose
to contrast the Supreme Court's exercise of the rule-making power
and its control of standards of evidence with the exercise of its
power to interpret and apply provisions of the Constitution to federal
procedures and to state procedures.
Let me state my thesis and then examine it in the light of the
recent developments regarding the use of confessions obtained by
in-custody interrogation embodied in the Miranda2 decision. Of
course, up until that time all the state courts and all federal appellate
courts judged the admission of confessions by whether they were
voluntary in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. No court
had held that the failure to give warnings and to advise of the right
to counsel, by itself and without more, rendered a confession inad-
missible.
It was obvious from the Court's opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois,3
that many members of the Court entertained serious doubts regarding
in-custody interrogation by the police and the admissibility of any
confession resulting therefrom. Although the case turned on the
use of Escobedo's confession of murder which had been obtained
after he had been denied access to his counsel who had come to the
* This paper was originally delivered at the annual meeting of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 1-4, 1967... J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).21d.
3 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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police station, much of what Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote for the
majority of five looked like handwriting on the wall for all in-custody
interrogations.
What should the Court have done in order to fashion rules for
in-custody interrogation? We must, of course, take account of the
nature of our federal system.
In my opinion, the Court could and should have used the
machinery of the rule-making power for federal criminal cases which
Congress gave it in 1940 and which it has used many times since in
promulgating and later amending the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. While of course any federal rules would bind only the
federal courts, they would set an example for state action. In the
light of experience under federal rules, and in the States under
whatever procedures the States chose to follow, rules and procedures
found acceptable and practicable might eventually become the due
process standard for judging all state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was in just this way that the doctrine of Gideon v.
Wainwright,' which required counsel to be furnished to indigents in
felony trials, developed from the Supreme Court decision of 1938
in Johnson v. Zerbst.5 Subsequently a provision was inserted in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, and more than
twenty States took voluntary action before the Gideon6 decision in
1963.
The use of the federal rule-making machinery provides many
advantages. In 1964, a distinguished Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules was at work on further revision of the rules under
the chairmanship of Circuit Judge John C. Pickett of the Tenth
Circuit. The committee consisted of three federal judges, three
well-known professors of law and five distinguished practicing
lawyers. In addition, Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr. was the report-
er. The practice of the advisory committee, and of all such advisory
committees, has been to solicit suggestions from judges and lawyers
throughout the country, to publish and distribute their proposals
for discussion and further study and to revise the proposals accord-
ingly. With the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure this
part of the process took three years, and with the most recent
4372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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amendments, which became effective July 1, 1966, it took over two
years. Thus the bench and the bar and federal law enforcement
agencies are allowed ample opportunity for the submission of facts
and opinions, and, what is equally important, they have ample notice
of any new requirements which mandate a change in their practices.
After the advisory committee has agreed on its proposals, the rules
are passed on by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
a standing committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
of which Circuit Judge Maris has been chairman. The proposals
are then submitted to the Judicial Conference. Of course they come
as no surprise to that body; the twenty-five judicial members of the
Conference have received copies of each successive draft, they are
consulted and they themselves make suggestions.
With the approval of the Conference the rules then go to the
Supreme Court. If the Court approves, the Chief Justice then
transmits the rules to the Congress and they may become effective
not sooner than ninety days after such submission to Congress. The
latest amendments were submitted February 28, 1966, with the
provision that they would be effective July 1, four months later.
The Supreme Court has exercised the power to fashion rules for
the admission of evidence in criminal cases since its earliest days.
In McNabb v. United States,7 where the Court excluded confessions
obtained after protracted interrogation of the defendants before their
arraignment, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal trials have not been restricted . . . to those derived
solely from the Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory
power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts . . . this Court has, from the very beginning of its
history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal
criminal prosecutions . . . and in formulating such rules of
evidence in federal criminal trials the Court has been guided
by considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons of
evidentiary relevance.
And more recently we find Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court
in Hawkins v. United States,8 where the Court adhered to the rule
7 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
8 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958).
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excluding the testimony of the defendant's wife, upon the defendant's
objection:
But Congress or this Court, by decision or under its rule-making
power, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3771, can change or modify the rule
where circumstances or further experience dictates.
After Congress, in 1940, had given the Supreme Court the power to
prescribe "rules of pleading, practice and procedure with respect
to any or all proceedings prior to and including verdict" of a jury or
judgment of the Court, or a plea of guilty, in criminal cases,9 the
well settled power of the Court to fashion rules of evidence was
expressly confirmed in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective in March 1946, in these words:
The admissibility of evidence and the competence and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an Act of Congress
or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
Moreover, these federal criminal rules of 1946 did deal explicitly
with evidence in Rule 41 which lays down requirements regarding
search warrants and which provides for a motion to suppress any
evidence where the property has been illegally seized without a
warrant, or under a warrant which is insufficient, or where the
property was not described in the warrant, or where there is a
failure of probable cause to issue the warrant, or where the warrant
has been illegally executed.
Thus, after Escobedo'" in 1964, when the Supreme Court was
petitioned to review cases involving in-custody interrogation it could
have chosen either one of two well-defined methods for dealing with
the problem in federal cases. It could have referred the question
to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules which was then
considering further amendments to these rules, or it could have
announced a new rule of evidence for federal cases. I submit that
there was no need whatever for the Court to take the constitutional
route and discover a new rule by a novel interpretation of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. There was even less reason to go one step
further and engraft the newly discovered constitutional requirements
9 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964).
10 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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upon state criminal procedures by way of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There are several reasons why changes such as those which were
made in the Miranda'" decision and those which must follow as a
consequence should be made by announcing new rules of evidence
rather than by thrusting a constitutional straitjacket on both federal
and state courts.
First, if it had been a rule of evidence that confessions could not
be received unless the warnings had been given then such a rule
could have been changed or modified by the same rule-making
process, or by Act of Congress, in the light of experience. We do
know that many prosecutors, including Frank Hogan of New York
County, are finding that Miranda is preventing the solution of many
serious crimes such as homicides.
Second, the Miranda decision holds only that evidence must be
excluded unless certain warnings have been given in advance of
taking any statement from a defendant in custody. The decision
does not and cannot directly reform and supervise police action. As
the Miranda decision is a rule of evidence it should have been treated
as a rule of evidence.
Third, as the Miranda decision represented a complete break with
all past procedures, it was all the more desirable to see how the new
rule of evidence would affect prosecution of federal crimes before
deciding whether it was a denial of due process for the States to
receive confessions where Miranda warnings were not given. Until
the Court announced its Miranda discoveries no jurisdiction in this
country or anywhere in the world barred the use of confessions in
the absence of such warnings. The rule in this country had always
been that the only test was whether the confession was voluntary.
Fourth, had the Miranda decision been introduced as a rule of
evidence for the federal courts alone, the States would have been
left free to experiment with other ways of handling the admittedly
difficult problems of reducing to a minimum the possibilities of
coercion during in-custody interrogation.
Although the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States'2 which
announced the federal rule that evidence illegally obtained would
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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not be received in a trial was not binding on the States, in due course
some of the States later followed the federal rule. Consequently, by
the time the Supreme Court finally held in Mapp v. Ohio" that due
process required the States not to receive illegally seized evidence,
it was apparent that the rule would not cripple law enforcement. The
requirement that counsel be provided in felony cases where the
defendant is unable to retain counsel is an even better example of
Supreme Court leadership. The rule was announced for the federal
courts in 1938 in Johnson v. Zerbst,"4 and was soon followed by
many States. When Gideon'" was argued in 1963, twenty-two States
supported reversal of the Florida conviction, an impressive demon-
stration that the rule was workable. The Supreme Court decision
was unanimous in holding that the Florida conviction must be
reversed as Gideon's trial for felony, without the counsel for which
he had asked, was a denial of due process.
Fifth, if it should turn out that police adherence to the new ritual
makes impossible the solution of many serious crimes, and the
prosecution of those thought responsible, the new rule cannot be
modified under ordinary rule-making procedures. The Court has
imbedded it in the concrete of constitutional construction and it can
be blasted out only by an overruling decision of the Court or by
constitutional amendment. I should mention one additional way in
which the States might be relieved and that is if the Congress were
to provide otherwise under the exercise of its express power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce by appropriate
legislation" the provisions of the Amendment.
Sixth, the Court's indulgence in constitutional decision-making,
rather than adopting rules fashioned under the rule-making power,
deprives the Court and the country of the benefit of the considered
views and experience of other federal judges, of state judges, members
of the bar and law enforcement officers. The Court thus loses the
benefit of the views of those who have a broader and deeper
involvement and knowledge than the nine members of the Court can
possibly have.
Even Mr. Justice Douglas has recently taken the position in
dissenting from the Supreme Court promulgation of the amendments
to criminal rules that the responsibility for issuing the rules should
13 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
1' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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rest with the Judicial Conference and not with the Supreme Court.
In his dissent he said:
"Members of the Judicial Conference, being in large part judges
of the lower courts and attorneys who are using the rules day in
and day out, are in a far better position to make a practical
judgment upon their utility or inutility than we."' 6
It is true that in his opinion in Miranda the Chief Justice indicated
that the States still had responsibility in this area and that they had
the power to regulate the protection of the privilege.
We cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adher-
ence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our
decision in no way creates a constitutional strait-jacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting
the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement
of our criminal laws.'7
Yet the Court knew full well that the American Law Institute,
after laboring eighteen months, had already published tentative
proposals for a pre-arraignment code, which were distributed on
March 1, 1966, more than three months before the Miranda decision
was announced. These proposals had the scrutiny of an advisory
committee of forty members of which fifteen were members of
Committees of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice
Project. The proposals were drafted and studied in much the same
way that the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference had
drafted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Court's complete disregard of these proposals points to
reason number seven, which is that by using the decision route,
instead of the rule-making route, the Court provided for only a small
fraction of the many problems which follow in the wake of so
complete a break with the past.
Any comprehensive consideration of these problems, such as rule-
making permits, would consider in addition the circumstances under
16AMENDMENTS TO RuLEs OF CRMINAL PROCEDURE, 383 U.S. 1090
(1965).
17 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 467 (1966).
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which interrogation could be conducted before arrest and custody,
the protection which should be accorded while in custody, the records
which should be kept, the circumstances under which the defendant
may waive his rights and what provision should be made for
recording this and any statement which is obtained thereafter. The
American Law Institute proposals dealt with these matters. Work
on this code is now going forward to ascertain what modifications
are required by Miranda and with what subjects the code can and
should deal in light of that decision. For example, can the trial
court be given discretion to admit confessions where it can be said
that any neglect in giving any part of warnings was insubstantial
and harmless and where there would be a failure of justice if the
confession was not used?
A further question is the extent to which the prosecution should
be permitted to use tangible evidence such as a gun, a knife, or
a body which has been found as a result of a confession which for
some reason it cannot use.
Reason number eight is that in promulgating rules the Court must
specify an effective date which is some time in the future. As the
rules are a matter of common knowledge long in advance of such
effective date, law enforcement officers are thus given plenty of
time to prepare the adjustments in practice and regulation which
may be required. Promulgation by decision in particular cases
usually means that new procedures must go into effect immediately,
with no advance notice whatever. In addition the Court must decide
the exact date to which the decision is retroactive. While the Court
promptly limited Miranda to all trials commencing after the date of
the Miranda decision, it did have the effect of frustrating the
prosecution of many cases involving serious crimes, where confes-
sions had been obtained without warning and the cases had not yet
been tried or disposed of.
In short, I can see no good reason for announcing such rules of
evidence as Miranda by way of court decision. In no event would
the Court be foreclosed from casting the rule in constitutional terms
if and when the point is reached, after suitable experience by the
States, when it can say that due process then requires the observance
of certain procedures by all States. This is precisely what occurred
regarding the use by the States of illegally obtained evidence and
also-regarding assignment of counsel in felony cases. But the reverse
process of starting with constitutional declaration is far more difficult
[Vol. 70
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to undo or modify if later experience should teach the advisability
of change.
Can the States, through their legislatures or their courts, take any
action which may make it more desirable for the Supreme Court to
withhold for a suitable time decisions which result in new require-
ments in state criminal procedures which are cast in constitutional
terms?
Of course, many of the States are moving in this direction by
revisions of their codes of criminal procedure, through commissions
appointed to prepare such revisions. I suggest this process would
move forward more rapidly and more certainly if the States, by
legislative action, or constitutional amendment where necessary,
empowered their highest courts to draft and promulgate rules of
criminal procedure as the Congress has empowered the Supreme
Court to do.
The next step would then be for the state supreme courts to make
wise and constant use of this power, through committees of their
bar and their judiciary.
We have learned that improvement of our criminal procedures is
too sporadic and uncertain where it has been left solely to legislative
action supplemented only by occasional court decisions which can
govern only particular and very limited areas of the criminal process.
Under the rule-making power as authorized by Congress, the Court
has the initiative, the bar through the Judicial Conference does most
of the work, the Court retains a veto power and the power of proposal,
and the Congress has the ultimate veto power. In addition the
Congress still retains undiminished its power to legislate. Thus the
rule-making power is a joint undertaking of all those who have a
special responsibility for the administration of criminal justice. All
the reasons which support the proposition that the Supreme Court
should promulgate its Code of Criminal Procedure through the
process of making rules, I submit, are also reasons why the States
should deal with the many current problems of criminal justice by
having such rules formulated under the supervision of their highest
court, subject to the approval of, and modification by, the state
legislature. The rule-making process is thus a joint undertaking of
all the agencies of government and the bar.
Our experience with criminal justice over the past one hundred
years teaches us that the improvements required by changing times,
19681
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and made possible by a more affluent society simply will not come
about without the active supervision of the courts. This is the
responsibility of the courts-to lead the way, to suggest those
methods which will best enable the States, whose ministers of justice
they are, to provide the laws, the rules and the machinery so that
law enforcement may be sufficiently effective and individual rights
will be suitably observed.
My preliminary research discloses that only in twelve States
(including New Jersey, Massachusetts and Virginia) do the courts
have power to enact rules of procedure. I doubt that any of these
States have attempted to deal with the admission of evidence secured
through police interrogation; and there may be some doubt whether
the enabling statute gives them authority to do so.
While the acceptance of this responsibility and its discharge through
supervision of the rule-making power is, of course, some additional
burden for an already busy court, the responsibility can be so
delegated and organized that it is reduced to a minimum. In any
event, the Court is really dealing prospectively and wholesale with
problems which it is bound to face at some time. It is far better for
all concerned to attempt to formulate solutions of the principal
problems in a thorough, considered way than it is to deal with them
piecemeal and retail.
Moreover, the rule-making power provides a means of continuing
supervision. As new problems arise and experience shows that
amendments are required the machinery is already at hand and can
be set in motion without delay. Rule-making as a constant and
continuing process also provides a means of using in a constructive
way the knowledge and learning of the law school professors.
From a reading of recent Supreme Court opinions and the views
of the individual Justices it is easy to see some areas which the
Court may soon be considering further, such as the handling of
charges against juveniles, the obligation of the prosecutor to disclose
evidence and information to the defense, the State's obligation to
advise of the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases and the obligation
to furnish counsel in those cases, the need for hearings and counsel
in procedures for revocation of probation and parole.
I will add one item which I believe cries out for action by the
appellate courts, and that is delay. Delays at every stage of the
[Vol. 70
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criminal process are increasing and this trend will continue to
escalate as counsel are brought into many more cases at an earlier
stage and are provided also at later stages. Trial and appellate courts,
through better administration and by rule making, can meet this
challenge, and even reduce present delays, if they are given the
power and the means to do so. Among the needed means are more
trial court judges and more better qualified supporting personnel and
administrative assistants for all the courts.
Judges ordinarily are too bashful and backward about stating the
needs of their courts and asking for what the courts need. We
cannot be expected to keep up the quality of our work, and accept
added obligations of the nature I am suggesting unless we are given
the help and the money to do the job.
If delays in the disposition of criminal cases keep mounting, with
the inevitable adverse effect on the administration of criminal justice,
the courts will get the blame. We had better keep the record straight
from the beginning and speak our needs so that we may be adequately
prepared instead of waiting until we are overwhelmed.
While considerable progress has been made toward making the
administration of criminal justice a process which more fairly judges
those charged with crime and more fairly treats them if they are
found guilty, we must recognize that the net result of the past six
years has been to make it more and more difficult to arrest and
prosecute those suspected of crime and prove the guilt of those who
have offended. Only by adopting comprehensive plans can we begin
to restore to the police and prosecutors the means of getting evidence
and proving their case in court. Piecemeal decisions which one by
one chip away at the powers of the police, without preserving their
ability to act when serious crimes are committed, should give way to
the consideration and adoption of procedures, rules and statutes
which are designed to keep the balance true between enforcement
of law and the safeguarding of individual rights.
The shopkeeper ought not to feel that his life and property can be
protected only by his own gun; the juror ought not to feel that he
must convict every defendant because court decisions have gone
too far to prevent offenders from being brought to justice; the judges
ought not to feel that they must compensate for procedures which
they dislike, and sentences which are too harsh, by finding some way
1968]
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of reversing convictions, with the result that law enforcement
everywhere must be conducted under new restrictions.
I hope that, as the result of all the studies now under way, including
the ABA Minimum Standards Project for Criminal Justice, the judges
of our country will conclude that by their acceptance of additional
responsibility they can lead the way toward more effective and just
enforcement of the criminal laws.
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